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Informing the Government or Fostering Public Debate? How Chinese 
Discussion Forums Open Up Spaces for Deliberation 
 
Yu Sun, Todd Graham, and Marcel Broersma 
 
Abstract 
This article focuses on a popular form of civic practice in China: casual political 
talk that occurs in online spaces that are not ostensibly political. We investigate 
how Chinese citizens engage in politics through a comparative analysis of 
everyday talk on health issues across three popular online discussion forums: a 
government-orientated forum (Qiangguo Luntan), a commercial-lifestyle forum 
(Tieba), and a commercial-topical forum focused on parental advice (Yaolan). 
Our findings show that conventional deliberation directly involving conflictual 
and resistant attitude against state authorities is not prominently embraced by 
Chinese citizens in everyday online settings. However, communal and less 
confrontational forms of discourse are important for the proto-political talk to 
turn political, thus serving as prerequisite conditions for the emergence of an 
online public sphere. We argue that to explain how the public sphere emerges in 
everyday (non-political) spaces in China, it is essential to take communal 
discursive forms into account.  
Keywords 
Political talk; online deliberation; public sphere; China; online forums; public 
healthcare politics  
 
Introduction 
The internet has evolved rapidly in China in the last 25 years. It is now used by more 
than half of the population (CNNIC 2017), penetrating many aspects of Chinese 
people’s lives. Scholars have long debated the extent to which this has brought about 
political change in China. Some scholars claim the internet has facilitated the growth of 
civil society and the expansion of the public sphere, despite the government’s measures 
to control it (Yang 2003; Zheng and Wu 2005; Yang 2009; Jiang 2010). Critics argue 
that the government adopted the Chinese internet as a tool of authoritarian control and 
propaganda to win legitimacy and sustain the regime (Kalathil and Boas 2003; 
Mackinnon 2011). Our work builds upon recent studies that reflect upon the limitations 




actors within Chinese cyberspace (Han 2015a). We focus on a popular form of civic 
practice which has been understudied in current Chinese internet scholarship: ca ual 
political talk that occurs in online spaces that are not ostensibly political but offer a 
social realm for citizens to detect issues of public concern from citizens’ lifeworld and 
engage in relevant public discourse.  
Unlike Western democracies, where citizens can participate in civic 
organizations, voting, and formal forums for political engagement, it is difficult for 
Chinese citizens to articulate their concerns about public (health) issues through civic 
organizations or other formal means of political participation. However, if the state 
considers it in the public interest, it provokes and channels debate in a controlled 
manner. In 2009, the government invited citizens to participate in the process of 
healthcare reform through online portals specifically established for this reason. 
However, these online consultation channels were mainly accessed by society’s 
privileged groups (Balla 2014).  
Due to the lack of physical spaces and limited online spaces for participation, 
Chinese citizens generally participate in politics through informal networks. In these 
unofficial spaces, citizens can circumvent censorship in their conversations (Liu 2017). 
Given this lack of formal space to participate in healthcare policymaking, internet-based 
communications may provide a way for ordinary citizens to discuss and negotiate these 
issues with the established order. In this article, we analyze how average, politically 
disorganized Chinese citizens use these forums to politically engage with health issues 
in their everyday life, and how they negotiate with healthcare policies at the micro-level 
in their everyday talk about public health. We ask whether deliberation or other forms 




strengthen the public’s position in (healthcare) governance. Specifically, we examine 
how citizens talk about healthcare issues online, and how this intertwines with aspects 
and practices of everyday life: interpersonal relations, social interactions, and cultural 
context (Habermas 1987, 138).  
The Position of the Public in Healthcare Governance 
With the complaint “Too difficult to see a doctor, too expensive to see a doctor!” 
spreading in China, healthcare reform has been pushed up on the national political 
agenda. Bridging the private and public spheres, health issues open up space for citizens 
to participate in the politics of public health policy (Liu 2009). In China, the 
relationships between healthcare providers, citizens (patients), and different levels of 
government are important determinants of the governance structure (Ramesh et al. 
2012). Patients are the most vulnerable actors in relation to both local governments and 
healthcare service providers, due to the limited channels for mobilizing and organizing 
collective action (Ramesh et al. 2012). The government’s capacity to supervise and 
control has been weakened since it reduced subsidies for healthcare providers and 
public hospitals were given autonomy to pursue their interests during the transition to a 
market economy. Consequently, citizens’ participation is extremely important for the 
central government to hold local governments accountable and to supervise regional 
providers, thus winning legitimacy for the CCP’s (Communist Party of China) rule. 
Public participation plays a crucial role in the complex structure of healthcare 
governance. 
In 2008, the public was first invited to participate in reforming healthcare, 
signaling a “healthcare democracy” (Liu 2009). Chinese citizens were able to articulate 




healthcare policy (Kornreich et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the online portals only offered 
citizens the chance to respond to the government’s policy; citizen deliberation on 
healthcare issues was not promoted (Kornreich et al. 2012). Moreover, this was a 
communication process between the government and selected citizens, who tended to be 
well-educated, urban, and middle class (Balla 2014). 
Given such a narrow space for ordinary people to participate in healthcare 
policymaking, whether and how the internet can strengthen the public’s position in 
healthcare governance remains worthy of scholarly attention. This study moves beyond 
government-initiated and -organized online platforms, and instead focuses on informal 
online spaces where ordinary citizens conduct casual conversations about their everyday 
life experiences and where political talk emerges. We investigate the civic and 
participatory opportunities that such spaces open up regarding health care issues. 
The Chinese Internet and the Public Sphere 
With the rapid expansion of ICTs, there has been growing scholarly debate about the 
internet’s implications for Chinese politics and society. Some view the internet as a tool 
for political change, arguing it has not only provided users with access to the pluralist 
framing of issues (Lewis 2013), but it has also strengthened civic networks (Yang 2003; 
Yang 2007). Moreover, it has nurtured a contentious and participatory cyber-culture 
(Yang 2009), opened up spaces for public deliberation (Jiang 2010), and promoted the 
public sphere (Zheng and Wu 2005). 
Others believe that the Chinese internet is merely a tool for authoritarian control. 
Confronting the challenges of the digital world, the Chinese government has developed 
strategies such as applying computer filtering to censor sensitive topics, encouraging 




information or activity that potentially threatens the stability of the state is forbidden. 
Mackinnon (2011, 33) calls this “networked authoritarianism”. According to King et al. 
(2013), the government tolerates general social criticism online but oppresses activities 
aimed at mobilizing collective action.  
In response to the changing internet ecology, the government has updated its 
online strategies to tighten its control. New tactics have been applied, including hiring 
online commentators – the “water army” or “fifty-cent army” – to shape online opinion 
(King et al. 2013). The government has also been taking more proactive measures to 
maintain social stability such as pushing local officials online to interact with netizens 
via e-government programs. Schlæger and Jiang (2014, 18) show that official 
microblogging mostly reinforces existing power arrangements, producing “politics as 
usual”.  
Existing literature on state-society relations in the digital age has demonstrated 
the resistant effect of the internet but has also revealed internet adoption strategies 
aimed at enhancing the state’s resilience. To do justice to the dynamics of political 
communication in China, scholars have called for a new framework for rethinking the 
complex and plural nature of the Chinese internet. As Han’s (2015a) study shows, 
various social actors can influence the formation of public opinion. For instance, the 
“voluntary fifty-cent army”, who are neither enthusiastic about political contention, nor 
supportive of state propaganda, are influential in the process of public deliberation.  
Online Spaces and Everyday Political Talk in China  
Coleman (2007, 57) asserts that beyond the formal political sphere there are “potential 
spaces of democracy” in everyday life where ordinary individuals can actively negotiate 




users but also shape citizens’ public life. Papacharissi (2010) suggests that internet-
enabled everyday practices constitute a new social realm for citizens’ civic engagement.  
Unlike liberal democracies where public participation tends to be 
institutionalized by civic organizations, political participation in China is unorganized 
and un-institutionalized. Given the lack of physical spaces of participation, everyday 
digital practices may provide civic engagement opportunities. Such practices are 
allowed, and sometimes actively fostered, by the government. For example, Teets 
(2014, 2) argues that “consultant authoritarianism” has been promoted in China to 
encourage the growth of civil society under the state’s authoritarian rule. Moving 
beyond the simple dichotomy of resistance and control, this model emphasizes the 
symbiotic relationship between the state and society. It argues that the state encourages 
plural forms of political participation from the bottom up while at the same time 
creating more indirect and nuanced forms of control. The Chinese word guan (to 
manage), which means to control, supervise, and discipline (like parents taking care of 
children), represents the state’s attitudes towards civil society, thus embodying the 
patriarchal underpinnings of China’s consultant authoritarianism.   
Scholars have observed new and innovative ways of being political thru 
mundane online practices by Chinese netizens. For example, Weibo activists use 
depoliticized discourse to articulate their claims and contest the hegemony of official 
discourses (Gleiss 2015). However, as of yet a popular form of civic practice has been 
understudied in Chinese internet studies: casual political talk that occurs in online 
spaces that are not ostensibly political.  
Political talk opens up opportunities for political engagement. It is more 




settings (Zhang 2010). Moreover, ordinary political conversations bridge the personal 
and political spheres, creating a more integrated lifeworld (Wyatt et al. 2000) where 
citizens can develop their subjectivities and understand others (Kim and Kim 2008). 
Everyday political talk also helps citizens “work out their preferences, try out 
justifications for them, and develop confidence about performing in the public arena” 
(Conover and Searing 2005, 281). Most importantly, blurring the boundaries of the 
political and non-political, everyday political talk carries the potential to open up a 
public realm where Chinese citizens can circumvent censorship. Thus, studying 
everyday political talk offers us chances to reveal how the dynamics of empowerment 
and control are negotiated at the micro-level under the stat ’s consultant 
authoritarianism (Teets 2014). By so doing, we are enabled to further explore the 
complex nature of the online public sphere emerging from non-political space.  
Research Focus and Method  
The Chinese internet is fragmented and localized and permeated by urban and 
consumerist lifestyles (Damm 2007). This does not encourage citizens to pursue radical 
democratic change, but rather promotes personal and identity politics. This article 
extends these insights in state-society dynamics by exploring mundane communicative 
practices in everyday spaces. These do not necessarily have a political goal or involve 
the state, yet they contribute to developing citizens’ subjectivity and civic agency. Our 
approach focuses on mundane online political conversations about public health issues 
that reveal the social-civic culture where those communicative practices take place.  
We adopted an inclusive approach to analyze the nature of political talk, 
involving both its deliberative qualities and its informal, everyday characteristics. First, 




communicative action and the public sphere (1984, 1987, 1989, 1996), to explore 
whether/how Western ideals are applied in the Chinese context. The public sphere refers 
to a social space where citizens engage in the exchange of claims about matters of 
common concern, aiming at a shared understanding of the discussed issue (Habermas, 
1984). Communicative action, the process of deliberation, is central in the formation of 
a communicative space for citizens to discover what concerns the common good and 
what political will they have. Similarly, in China, we think informal deliberation 
(political talk) – the exchange of opinions and concerns – enables citizens to identify 
political issues from their lifeworld, which is an important condition of a public sphere.  
Discursive exchanges do not always occur in the form of strict deliberation; they 
might be embedded within other forms of communication originating from the informal 
characteristics of everyday political talk in China. Therefore, we also examined social-
civic communicative forms unique to the social-cultural norms of Chinese society. 
Taking into account the social-cultural dimensions that anchor practices of everyday 
political talk, we construct a more grounded model of deliberation and the (online) 
public sphere in China. We ask the following research questions:  
 
RQ1. To what extent does political talk in Chinese online spaces meet the conditions of 
deliberation as outlined in Habermas’s public sphere theory?  
 
RQ2. What social-civic communicative forms, beyond the framework of deliberation, 





We examine three Chinese-speaking discussion forums with distinct characters: 
a government-run political forum, a commercial-lifestyle forum that mixes politics with 
lifestyle issues, and a commercial-topical forum dedicated to parental advice. The latter 
two forums are not obviously political but are primarily concerned with private matters 
such as lifestyle issues and parenting. Sometimes, during everyday talk, these spaces 
become political as participants make connections between their lives and the social 
issues of the day. We expect that everyday talk triggers deliberative discussions more 
frequently on the governmental forum than the commercial forums, while social-civic 
forms of communication, which are not considered central to the conventional notion of 
deliberation, are more prominent on the commercial ones. The differences and 
similarities that emerge from our comparative analysis allow us to better understand and 
explain the communicative practices emerging in everyday online spaces in China. 
Based on the comparative analysis, we ask:  
 
RQ3. How do the forum’s character/characteristics impact the nature of everyday 
political talk?   
Three cases 
Qiangguo Luntan (Strengthening the Nation Forum) is a political forum hosted by the 
People’s Daily. It was established in 1999 as a space for nationalistic protest against 
NATO’s bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia. It subsequently became a 
platform for discussion of policy issues concerning China’s development.  
Baidu Tieba (hereafter, Tieba) was started in 2003 by the Chinese search engine 




among grass-roots users because of its entertainment orientation. It provides a social 
hub for citizens to discuss fun stuff (e.g., games and comics) and other lifestyle matters.  
Yaolan is a non-political forum established in 1999 to help parents deal with the 
problems of child-rearing. The website covers topics related to pregnancy, health and 
nutrition, childcare, and education.  
Sampling 
Identifying political talk about public health issues in non-political spaces is like 
looking for a needle in a haystack. Similar to Wright’s (2018) sampling method for 
identifying political talk in non-political spaces, or what he calls online ‘third spaces’, 
we first used keywords to identify potential threads where political talk about public 
health issues may have emerged (see Table 1). The keywords reflect citiz ns’ public 
health concerns, covering broad topical areas discussed in public at the time of data 
collection, allowing us to grasp as much related data as possible.1 Thr ads were then 
checked for the presence of ‘political’ talk.  
Wright et al. (2015, 74) describe political talk as something that “emerges in the 
process of everyday talk, often interweaved with conversations that do not have a 
political character, includes mundane reflections upon power, its uses and ramifications, 
and possesses qualities that enable it to contribute to meaningful public action”. How 
then do we identify ‘political’ talk? Using Graham’s (2008, 22–23) criteria for 
identifying political talk in non-political forums, which used a broad approach inspired 
by Mansbridge (1999), threads that contained a post where a participant linked an 
experience or a particular interest/concern to more general public health issues in China 




response by other participants, were selected for analysis. 
Based on the above criteria, we randomly collect 25 threads per forum created 
between 2013 and 2015.2 The Qiangguo Luntan sample consisted of 610 posts 
(January–September 2015). Discussions on this forum often relate to explicitly political 
topics such as public health policies, relevant policy proposals, and news. Tieba’s 
sample consisted of 1096 posts (January 2013–October 2015). Talk on Tieba tended to 
mix conventional public health politics with people’s personal public health 
experiences. The sample of political talk from Yaolan consisted of 472 posts (January 
2013–September 2015), mostly originating from participants’ private concerns about 
public health issues. 
 
Table1. Public Health Keywords  
 
Keywords  English translation 
੨✏/⾱✏/᧗✏ Smoking/anti-smoking/ban on smoking 
⯛㤇/䱢⯛/ছ⭏䱢⯛ Vaccines/epidemic prevention 
 ছ⭏ Public health and people’s livelihoodޡޜ
५䲒/५⭏ Hospitals/doctors 
ⴻ⯵ Medical care  
५؍ Health insurance  
५ᛓ⸋⴮ Doctor-patient relations 
५䰩 Violence against medical practitioners 
㦟૱/५㦟ᓇ Medicines/Drugstore 






Content analysis, which employed latent coding categories, was the primary method for 
examining the nature of online political talk. The unit of analysis was an individual 
post, and the context unit of analysis was the discussion thread where a post was 
situated. To provide more depth to the analysis, the quantitative findings are 
supplemented by qualitative examples and insight to demonstrate tendencies in online 
communicative practices. For an overview of the coding categories/measures, see Table 
2.  
 
Table 2. Coding Scheme Overview 
Coding category  Measurement  
Rationality  We measured rationality based on the presence or absence 
of the following: posts that were on topic and contained an 
explicit assertion supported by an expressed justification, 
which provided external evidence such as facts, sources, 
examples, or personal experiences –reasoned claim. 
 
Continuity  We measured continuity based on the presence or absence 
of strong-strings. A strong-string is a minimum of three 
posts involved in a reciprocal exchange of reasoned claims.  
Convergence We measured convergence based on the presence or 
absence of the following: posts that (partially) conceded (or 
agreed-to-disagree with) to the ‘better’ argument during the 
exchange. 
Reciprocity We measured reciprocity based on whether a post was a 
reply to another post. Posts were coded as replies if they 
responded to another post directly (via the platform’s reply 
function) or indirectly (latently responding to another post 
without using the reply function).   
 
Sincerity We measured sincerity based on the presence or absence of 




concerning the truthfulness/sincerity of another 
participant’s posts – questionable sincerity.  
 
Discursive equality We measured discursive equality based on the presence or 
absence of degrading comments: posts that degrade 




We measured complaining based on the presence or 
absence of the following: posts that expressed unhappiness 




We measured questioning based on the presence or absence 
of the following: posts that posed questions concerning a 
particular issue or relevant policy (questions of 




We measured advice-giving/helping based on the presence 
or absence of the following: posts aimed at 
helping/advising other participants.  
 
Storytelling We measured storytelling based on the presence or absence 
of the following: posts that tell a story/share experiences.  
 
Social talk We measured social talk based on the presence or absence 
of the following: posts containing chit-chat (e.g. greetings, 
banter), which did not involve any of the above-described 
behaviors.   
 
 
Our approach draws from coding frameworks developed in the field of online 
deliberation (Graham 2008, 2009; Stromer-Galley 2007); see Friess and Eilders’s 
(2015) overview of prominent frameworks used/developed in the field. Some of the 
earliest research on the internet and politics was the study of online political talk in non-




Dahlberg 2004a). Evaluating the democratic quality of everyday online communicative 
practices (through which the public sphere is constituted) has been one of the most 
popular areas of research in online deliberation (see Graham 2015; Friess and Eilders 
2015). Researchers here have constructed a set of normative conditions of public sphere 
discourse, which are then operationalized into measurable concepts and employed in 
empirical analyses. Habermas’s work (1984, 1987, 1989, 1996), especially his theory of 
communicative rationality, has been highly influential in this process. Likewise, we 
evaluated the deliberativeness of political talk by operationalizing the following 
conditions: rational-critical debate (the level of rationality, continuity, and 
convergence); dispositional requirements for achieving mutual understanding 
(reciprocity and sincerity); and the norms of debate (discursive equality).3  
However, simply focusing on the deliberativeness of political talk ignores it’s 
everyday, informal nature. Moreover, despite the theoretical developments on the civic 
value of, for example, story-telling, humor, and emotions and rhetoric, typical 
ingredients of everyday talk, procedural and substantive rationality still dominates; see 
Coleman and Moss’  (2012, 6-7) critique of the field. Thus, we moved beyond the 
normative framework of deliberation to capture different communicative practices of 
online political talk. Given that much of the literature in the field focuses on Western 
liberal democracies, we carried out a pilot study to develop a more grounded coding 
scheme. During this phase, we employed qualitative content analysis (Mayring 2000) – 
utilizing deductive and inductive coding techniques – to modify and develop (new) 
categories for social-civic forms of communication that emerged. This resulted in five 
coding categories: complaining, questioning, storytelling, advice-giving/helping, and 




To increase confidence in the findings, an inter-coder reliability test was 
conducted. The test was carried out by two coders on a random sample of 
approximately 20% of the posts. Calculated using Scott’s Pi, coefficients met 
appropriate acceptance levels ranging from .70 to .92.  
Findings 
Normative conditions of deliberation 
The first indicator under investigation was rationality – the extent to which opinion 
expressions were supported by reasoning and the use of external evidence. It was 
assessed by calculating the number of reasoned claims in relation to the total number of 
claims made. As Table 3 indicates, expressing a position or stating a claim accounted 
for roughly two-thirds of the Qiangguo Luntan posts (66.1%). Slightly more than half 
of these posts (34.1%) provided facts and sources to support claims, while assertions 
were slightly less frequent at 32%. In other words, Qiangguo Luntan participants often 
expressed their opinions about public health issues backed up by reasoning and external 
evidence. Tieba users expressed viewpoints less frequently compared to Qiangguo 
Luntan users, representing 45.1% of Tieba posts. Their opinions were slightly less 
rational than those of Qiangguo Luntan users. Opinion expression was even less 
frequent on Yaolan, representing 42.8% of all posts. Unlike Qiangguo Luntan and Tieba 
participants, opinions were primarily expressed using assertions, accounting for 30.1% 
of all posts compared to 12.7% for reasoned claims.   







Tieba (N=1096) Yaolan (N=472) 
Reasoned claims 34.1 21.4 12.7 
Non-reasoned claims 32.0 23.7 30.1 
Reciprocity (Replies) 12.8 57.6 69.9 
Continuity 6.7 19.7 0.0 









Note: We used chi-square tests to conduct significance testing for differences across forums. 
Only the results of key indicators of deliberation are listed:  
For claims, ぬ²(2, N=2178) =83.24,  p< .001; For reciprocity, ぬ²(2, N=2178) =434.24,  p< .001; 
For continuity, fisher’s exact test was conducted, p< .001.  
 
The second indicator was reciprocity, which requires participants to read and 
respond to each other’s posts. As Table 3 reveals, the level of replies was low in 
Qiangguo Luntan, accounting for 12.8% of posts. However, reciprocity was much 
higher in both the commercial and non-political forums. On Tieba, replies represented 
57.6% of the sample while on Yaolan roughly 70% of posts were replies. The results 
suggest that when netizens talk about healthcare issues in less ‘political’ spaces, which 
primarily have a social purpose and are grounded in everyday life, they engage more 
with each other, (potentially) fostering an online community.   
The next indicators were continuity and convergence, which require that the 




(convergence) is achieved. The level of extended debate refers to the frequency of 
continued interaction between participants via the use of arguments. We identified 
strong-strings, i.e., continued exchange of reasoned claims within threads. The level of 
extended debate was measured by calculating the number of posts in strong-strings. As 
Table 3 shows, only 6.7% of the posts were part of extended political debates on 
Qiangguo Luntan. Moreover, none of these exchanges ended in convergence. Extended 
debate among participants only occurred when it involved a controversial policy 
proposal or healthcare regulation. On Tieba, exchange of claims was relatively frequent, 
accounting for almost one-fifth of posts. For example, two Tieba users actively engaged 
in public debates about the new cooperative medical system which requires an increase 
of prepayment from rural citizens to cover more health services (Figure 1):  
 
A: “[…] It seems that the policy does not benefit us.”  
B A: “You do not need to buy the new health insurance if you think it is not good for 
you. This is not compulsory.”  
A: “The local government can not cancel the social welfare initiated by the state but 
they can force rural citizens to withdraw health insurance by raising the prepayment.” 
[…] It is soft coercion.”  
 
However, extended debate rarely led to the convergence of opinions. In contrast 
to Tieba, political talk on Yaolan rarely developed into extended debates and no posts 





Figure 1. An Extended Debate from Tieba 
 
The fifth indicator, sincerity, was measured by identifying acts of questionable 
sincerity and gauging the extent to which participants doubt/challenge the 
truthfulness/sincerity of other participants. Table 3 shows that no posts were coded as 
questionable sincerity, suggesting that participants’ po ts were perceived as sincere in 
all three forums. There is a caveat, however, as our analysis cannot detect the potential 
presence of hired online commentators (water/fifty-cent army). Such commentators are, 
of course, likely to speak in seemingly sincere ways to persuade common netizens to 
accept their pro-government ideas (Han 2015b).  
Discursive equality, our sixth indicator, requires participants to respect, 
recognize, and treat each other equally. Thus, posts were coded for instances when 
participants actively degraded someone’s character, quality, esteem, or rank. Table 3 
reveals that only 1.5% of posts on Qiangguo Luntan were degrading, suggesting a high-
level of civility among participants. On Tieba, 4.7% of posts contained degrading 




degrading comments often led recipients to post reasoning and evidence to support their 
claims, thus increasing the level of rationality and extended debate.  In other words, 
although uncivil behaviors were exhibited, they did not necessarily harm public debate 
on Tieba. Finally, no posts were coded as degrading on Yaolan. Overall, acts of 
inequality in all three forums were infrequent.   
Social-civic communicative practices 
Complaining allows citizens to express concerns, functioning as a form of citizens’ 
dialogue with powerful institutions. It is a type of civic behavior through which citizens 
attempt to indirectly push people exerting power or authority to enact social changes. 
Given the lack of direct channels for Chinese citizens to influence and participate in 
political decision-making, mass complaining online is an indirect force for political 
change in the internet era. Questioning is another way for Chinese citizens to criticize 
authorities and pressure them into tackling social problems.  
 
Table 4. Social-Civic Communicative Practices  
Civic behavior Qiangguo Luntan 
(N=610) 
 Tieba (N=1096) Yaolan (N=472) 
    
Complaining 32.1 16.1 15.9 
Questioning  3.6 0.3 0.6 













Note: We used chi-square tests to conduct significance testing for differences across forums. 
Only the results of the frequently practiced communicative forms are listed: 
For complaining, ぬ²(2, N=2178) =69.34,  p< .001;  For advice-giving/helping, p< .001(fisher’s 
exact test);  For storytelling, ぬ²(2, N=2178) =94.18,  p< .001 
 
As Table 4 indicates, complaining and questioning were most common on the 
political forum Qiangguo Luntan, representing 32.1% and 3.6% of the posts 
respectively. More than half of the posts coded as complaining were used in conjunction 
with reasoned claims or assertions to express critical views on public health issues. 
Participants voiced their grievances about the marketization of healthcare services, 
unethical practices and corruption in the healthcare system, and the unequal distribution 
of medical resources. Qiangguo Luntan participants engaged in daily resistance against 
injustices by claiming health rights via direct public grievances about the government’s 
inability to adequately address problems. At the same time, they used their complaints 
to express patriotic feelings towards the nation-state. This nationalist discourse does not 
appear to undermine the state or citizens’ civic claims; rather, it strengthens the idea of 
enhancing national interest by improving social welfare in public health. For instance, a 
participant posted a message about the lack of health insurance for older adults in rural 
China, while simultaneously stating that he was praying for China (Figure 2).  
 
 






Indirect counter-hegemonic discourse was applied in this example of a 
complaint.  
The national discourse emphasizes the public interest and challenges the legitimacy of 
local authorities when their actions run counter to the (perceived) public interest. 
However, it still conveys trust towards the party-state as participants sought solutions 
from the central government, for local injustices in healthcare policy that 
accommodated citizens’ appeals into the legitimacy of the state.  
On Tieba, 16.1% of posts were complaints. Nearly a quarter (22%) were 
expressed in combination with opinion expression (reasoned and non-reasoned claims). 
Unlike Qiangguo Luntan, 23.2% of coded complaints were expressed via the speech act 
of storytelling. Aggrieved citizens used personal experiences to complain about 
healthcare policies and unethical practices in hospitals. This fostered more radical 
criticism and posed a direct challenge to the legitimacy of government policies. For 
example, one participant complained about the newly imposed healthcare policy in rural 
areas, “Citizens do benefit from early healthcare policies; however, the continuously 
increasing healthcare costs have become a financial burden for many families. President 






Figure 3. An Example of Complaint from Tieba 
 
Similar to on Qiangguo Luntan, citizens – thru complaining – called on the central 
government to take action on Tieba when expressing complaints at the local level. They 
asked for the involvement of the central government as a separate power from local 
authorities, thus contributing to the sustainment of regime legitimacy in China.  
Complaints accounted for 15.9% of posts on Yaolan. They expressed 
dissatisfaction regarding doctors’ inappropriate treatment of patients, the government’s 
failure to monitor vaccine safety, and patients’ mobility across healthcare regions. 
Similar to Tieba, participants often expressed complaints via (personal) narratives about 
the injustices they encountered. This accounted for nearly a third of complaints (29.3%). 
For example, a participant posts: “As Moms, we are very worried about the quality of 
vaccines […]; we hope [central government] authorities can put more efforts into 






Figure 4. An Example of Complaint from Yaolan 
 
As this example illustrates, Yaolan participants ‘scaled-up’ by connecting their personal 
concerns to the public interest through mundane complaining. Participants thus 
problematized their everyday struggles with public health as a socio-political issue. But, 
they were less likely to connect their personal experiences to the structural cause of the 
problem, rarely blaming the government. Therefore, the complaints were not 
conventional counter-hegemonic discourse as they lacked subversive resonance and 
posed no challenge to the state’s legitimacy. Besides, participants tended to appeal to 
the government to solve public health problems, still trusting and relying on the power 
of state authorities as the example illustrates.  
Although participants on all three forums actively discussed healthcare politics 
by complaining, diverse discursive forms were employed to express daily grievances. 
This reflects the complexities of Chinese citizenship and how tensions between state 
and society play out on different platforms.  
Aside from these discursive behaviors, other communicative practices of civic 
virtue also emerged during political talk about public health issues. On occasion, 
participants advised or helped others. As Table 4 shows, this happened more frequently 
on Yaolan (13.6% of posts) than on the other forums. By joining this interactive 
process, Yaolan participants turned personal troubles with the healthcare system into 
common problems facing the larger public. Such advice-giving and information 
dissemination seemed to create a more informed community of participants. This, in 




problems. Moreover, an attitude of helping each other seemed to build trust and friendly 
social relations among Yaolan participants.  
Storytelling, a common way of making sense of the world, was another 
identified communicative behavior. This was most prominent on Tieba (20.7%) and 
Yaolan (29.7%), but relatively scarce on Qiangguo Luntan. Storytelling was a 
reciprocal affair on Tieba and Yaolan; replies accounted for 55.9% and 76.4% of posts 
respectively. Such interpersonal conversations not only seemed to enable and encourage 
participants to discuss healthcare issues, but they also created a friendly atmosphere that 
helped to form and sustain social connections. The public sharing of personal 
experiences allowed for the construction of a ‘collective experience’, which, in turn, 
fostered political agency regarding the symbolic, social, and behavioral aspects of civic 
engagement. 
As discussed, storytelling was a process of articulation that opens people’s 
personal experiences and concerns in everyday life. For instance, a Yaolan participant 
shared her difficult experience of making an appointment with the doctor at a public 
hospital, making her individual problem visible in a broader public realm (Figure 5). In 
this case, the speech act of storytelling facilitated opening private life in a public arena, 
but it is not contestatory, without explicitly opposing power agencies. 
 
 





Finally, political talk on healthcare issues sometimes developed into social talk. 
This accounted for 6.7% and 10.2% of Tieba and Yaolan’s posts respectively. For 
example, in a thread about tensions between doctors and patients, two participants 
shared their experiences as doctors, which eventually turned into chit-chat. Although 
not explicitly political, such social conversations facilitated connections and bonding 
among participants, strengthening their sense of belonging to the online community. 
Discussion 
The three online forums under investigation provided distinct settings for Chinese 
citizens to talk and engage in public health issues. We argue that different discursive 
spaces were opened up on the three forums through different forms of communication. 
Our comparative study reveals, in particular, the potential of non-political forums to 
foster relatively autonomous spaces for citizens to share life experiences and discuss 
public health issues. The findings confirm existing research positing that non-political 
spaces are highly significant for political engagement (Graham et al. 2015, 2016).  
Regarding RQ1, we find that, in most cases, political talk in these online spaces 
did not meet the conditions of deliberation outlined by Habermas’s public sphere 
theory. The results align with Medaglia and Yang’s (2016) findings on public 
deliberation in another Chinese online forum: online discussions do not show key 
features of deliberation. The government-run forum guided debate by publishing 
explicitly political topics such as public health-related policies and news. These were 
posted mostly by its staff in a bid to elicit input on how to implement relevant policies 
rather than giving citizens influence in policymaking. As a top-down forum for gauging 




personal experiences and concerns. Moreover, talk about public health issues did not 
foster an exchange of views, although there was a high level of rationality when 
presenting claims. This unidirectional feedback by citizens demonstrates the 
‘consultative’ nature of political talk on this forum. Citizens mostly used the forum to 
familiarize the state with issues they encountered and to suggest solutions.    
Surprisingly, we found that public deliberation emerged more freely in the non-
political online space (Tieba) where the agenda was not subject to direct centralized 
control. It was this commercial-lifestyle forum and not the explicitly political or 
apparently non-political forums where deliberative practices were most common. Tieba 
also operates under pre-moderation rules. However, as a commercial-lifestyle forum, it 
requires moderators to find a balance between censorship policies and commercial 
forces and public concerns. This leaves citizens more room for public expression. On 
Tieba, political talk about public health issues often emerged from posts about everyday 
troubles. Citizens were more willing to discuss issues they felt needed to change. 
Through its aims, commercial ambition, and social atmosphere, Tieba links the political 
with the personal, mixing politics with lifestyle matters, thus bridging the private-public 
divide. Granting citizens’ freedom to put private issues onto the political agenda, this 
everyday social space has further democratized “communication of information in 
Chinese society” (Tai 2006, 289). Indeed, it was not uncommon for disputes and 
different opinions to emerge, generating rational-critical debates among participants.  
The non-political (commercial-topical) forum Yaolan offers citizens a space for 
more interpersonal conversations about public health issues. Despite this, it did not 
foster rational-critical debate. A closer analysis revealed that personal concerns and 




The ways the Yaolan community interacted was influenced by communitarian norms 
based on neo-Confucian values which place the pursuit of the common good over the 
expression of self-interest (He 2014). The communal communicative practices are more 
appropriate for responding to the concerns and interests expressed by Yaolan 
participants than Western-style deliberation. 
Regarding RQ2, we found that when ordinary citizens discussed public health 
issues, it triggered various social-civic communicative practices beyond the framework 
of deliberation. Although Qiangguo Luntan does not support citizens’ deliberative 
practices, it is a space where participants engage in informal forms of (indirect) 
resistance to the state, i.e., complaining and questioning. Citizens challenge the 
legitimacy of certain policies but conform to a nationalist discourse rooted in a broader 
notion of public interest. In other words, they may talk critically about public health, but 
simultaneously downplay their criticism towards the state. 
Tieba and Yaolan participants frequently engaged in advice-giving, helping, 
storytelling, and social talk, using personal experiences to address broader political 
problems. They did not explicitly aim to influence government healthcare policies; 
rather, they used the forums to talk about their personal healthcare problems. According 
to Bennett and Segerberg (2012), personal communicative practices open to diverse 
forms of reasoning can preserve space for ordinary citizens to articulate their particular 
experiences and concerns. In this study, Tieba and Yaolan participants’ self-expression 
via storytelling, asking for or giving advice, or complaints served as communicative 
agency to frame social reality and transform personal troubles into public issues. 
As Tieba encourages its users to express their views, the communicative power 




evolutions of perspectives and opinions” (Conover and Searing 2005, 281). Moreover, 
social-civic communications strengthen civic and political socialization, which may 
promote effective deliberation. The Tieba findings support the assertion that informal 
political talk produces the social-civic preconditions for citizens to participate in public 
deliberation (Kim and Kim 2008; Marques and Maia 2010).  
Because Yaolan is devoted to self-help in parenting, childcare, and related 
lifestyle issues, it was no surprise that it had the highest levels of advice-giving, helping, 
storytelling, and social talk, common communicative practices (when talking politics) in 
self-help forums (Graham and Wright 2014; Graham et al. 2015, 2016). Through these 
social-civic forms of communication, participants learned about the lives of others and 
sought common ground, making visible personal concerns about public health. It is 
noteworthy that they employed non-resistant discursive forms, without confronting 
power agencies, to transform their personal experiences into political issues. 
Nevertheless, by providing a social, collaborative space for citizens to figure out 
problems, present concerns, and explore solidarity, Yaolan revealed significant civic 
value. Thus, the findings reaffirm the multiple functions of everyday talk, although it 
may not serve the goal of public deliberation (Conover and Searing 2005).  
Regarding RQ3, each of our three forums opened up a distinct discursive space 
for citizens to engage in politics. The government-led Qiangguo Luntan maintained a 
model of consultation with limited deliberation. However, it did provide opportunities 
for citizens to complain and bring issues to the state’s attention. It thus created an online 
space that enabled criticism of local governments and policies while maintaining 
consensus with the state. Conversely, the open and inclusive talk on Tieba and Yaolan 




spaces came into being for citizens to engage in public health politics. On the 
commercial-lifestyle forum (Tieba), people discussed public health issues in both 
deliberative and social-civic ways. This not only sustained a virtual civic community 
but was also an incubator of deliberative and participatory practices. Finally, as a 
commercial-topical forum, Yaolan’s self-governing community encouraged participants 
to pursue common interests and shared values via non-argumentative communications, 
beyond the ideals of deliberation, by referencing their personal experiences.   
Conclusion 
Based on our findings, we contend that the social-civic forms of communication largely 
constitute an (emerging) online public sphere in the everyday life context, while 
deliberation was not the central activity in the three forums under censorship rules. This 
suggests that under direct or indirect internet censorship, conventional (Western-style) 
deliberation directly involving conflictual and resistant attitude against state authorities 
is not embraced by Chinese citizens in everyday online settings. However, communal 
and less confrontational forms of discourse are important for the proto-political talk to 
turn political, thus serving as prerequisite conditions for the emergence of an online 
public sphere. Second, the way citizens extended the boundaries of public spaces on the 
forums was shaped by the characteristics of each platform. On the political forum, 
indirect counter-hegemonic discourses were applied by participants to express political 
concerns, while keeping a safe distance from the state. Differently, on the non-political 
forum, communal discourses (via social-civic communications) not focusing on 
antagonism, without explicitly involving power agencies, were dominant, expanding the 




implies that state-society dynamics are more cooperative than oppositional under 
China’s consultant authoritarianism.  
The online public sphere emerging from everyday political talk in our study 
reflects the patriarchal nature of China’s consultant authoritarianism (Teets 2014). 
There is a lack of rational-critical debate that confront the power of government but the 
expression of public opinion via social-civic communications that are not directly anti-
government is encouraged. Under the authoritarianism, the online public sphere 
functions more to inform the government than foster political debates that directly 
challenges the existing rule of the government, thereby, in a harmonious relationship 
with the state. Based on the analysis, we argue that to explain how the public sphere 
emerges in everyday (non-political) spaces in China, the conceptual operationalization 
of the public sphere needs to be extended to include communal discursive forms. They 
express civic values though not central to the confrontational process of rational 
debates.  
Notes 
1. More specifically, we drew from three broad sources of knowledge when 
developing the keyword list: a) our personal knowledge of public health in 
China; b) academic research and news media coverage; c) and our knowledge of 
the forums themselves (e.g., thru dozens of hours exploring the forums).     
2. Threads were initially collected during 2015. However, for two forums, we had 
to extend the time-frame to 2013 to allow for the collection of 25 threads as a 
means of maintaining the comparability of our sample. 
3. For a more comprehensive specification and discussion of the public sphere 
criteria – the normative conditions of deliberation used here – s e Graham 
(2009). Similarly, see Dahlberg’s (2004b) comprehensive set of normative 
conditions of public sphere discourse, which draws from Habermas’s theory of 
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